Introduction
The issue of sovereign debt restructurings has long figured prominently in the international policy agenda. The beginning of the present decade witnessed an intense debate on whether the international community should adopt a statutory approach centred on the establishment of an official debt restructuring mechanism to address sovereign insolvencies. Ultimately, this
proposal was dropped in favour of a less ambitious contractual approach based on the inclusion of collective action clauses and other innovations in international bond issuances.
Apart from committing the Institution to promote collective action clauses, this approach left the role of the IMF in coping with sovereign debt restructurings essentially unchanged.
The IMF's toolkit does not include any instrument specifically designed to deal with sovereign debt restructurings. This has provided the IMF with some flexibility to react to specific circumstances on a case by case basis, which has come at the cost of somewhat exacerbating the uncertainty that surrounds the official response to such disruptive episodes in international financial markets. In most cases, the IMF's involvement in debt restructurings has been articulated around a financial program approved either prior to the sovereign's restructuring plan, or as a result of it. Formally, there is no distinction between such programs and "traditional" IMF-supported programs. Only if a country falls into arrears with its external private creditors, as it is often the case during sovereign debt restructurings, does the policy of Lending Into Arrears (LIA) come into effect. This is why the LIA policy is often associated with the role of the IMF in sovereign debt restructurings. However, it is important to note that there is scope both for debt restructurings backed by an IMF program without activating the LIA policy (in the case of "pre-emptive" restructurings in which the sovereign remains current on its external debt payments) and for programs under the LIA policy in which only minor components of sovereign debt are re-negotiated in order to settle pending arrears.
The LIA policy has been included as one of the specific items for revision under the IMF's ongoing medium-term strategic review. One of the reasons why the LIA policy has come under closer scrutiny in recent years is the broad-based discontent with the role played by the Fund during the Argentine debt restructuring (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) . Indeed, this episode raised awareness about a number of shortcomings and ambiguities of the LIA policy, among which the following stand out in particular: (i) the Fund's financial exposure to the country that launches a restructuring tends to generate a conflict of interest for the Institution, and hence reduces its credibility as an impartial/independent player in the crisis resolution process; (ii) the good faith criterion, which conditions the Fund's financial support under the LIA policy, is fundamentally devoid of economic content and judgemental in nature, which leaves scope for arbitrariness in its interpretation; (iii) some have argued that, in order not to interfere with the negotiations between the sovereign debtor and its private creditors, the IMF should restrain from providing the "resource envelope" of the restructuring through its program's macroeconomic framework. Others, instead, argue that this is a key feature of the public good provided by the IMF during a restructuring process; (iv) intimately linked to the above is the ambiguity stemming from the Fund's role as a provider of information and the question of whether the Institution should systematically provide the parties involved in the restructuring with a debt sustainability analysis.
This paper is aimed at providing food for thought for the upcoming discussion on the review of the LIA policy. It departs from Díaz-Cassou, Erce and Vázquez (2008), a companion paper which comprehensively analyzes 9 sovereign debt restructurings: Argentina, Belize, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Pakistan, Russia, Serbia, Ukraine and Uruguay. Here we try to identify the various dimensions of the Fund's involvement in those processes. We focus on the eight cases in which an IMF-supported program was in place in the period surrounding the restructuring and, therefore, we drop the case of Belize from our analysis. Not in all of the cases covered in this paper was the LIA policy formally applied. However, we have extended our analysis beyond proper LIA cases for considering that, whenever a program was in place during the restructuring, the IMF was facing comparable policy challenges. Our idea, therefore, is that non-LIA programs in place during a restructuring can be informative and provide meaningful insights for the design of the LIA policy itself.
The reminder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the main features of the IMF's Policy of Lending Into Arrears. In section 3 we present a comparative analysis of the case studies covered in Díaz-Cassou et al. (2008) . We concentrate especially on the comparison between pre-emptive and post-default cases, on the degree of comprehensiveness of the various restructurings, and on the discriminatory treatment given to the different categories of domestic and external creditors. Section 4 concentrates more specifically on the role played by the IMF in the debt restructurings. Finally, section 5 concludes and presents some policy implications.
The Policy of Lending Into Arrears
Up until 1989 the IMF stuck to a policy of non-toleration of arrears to private creditors, meaning that all financial programs required the elimination of arrears and the non-accumulation of new arrears during the program period. This policy was seen as instrumental to provide both members states and private creditors with the incentives to seek a timely agreement in order to clear arrears and, potentially, to restructure debt. The protraction of the 1980's debt crisis, however, gradually undermined the rationale behind the non-toleration of arrears. Indeed, mainly as a result of the development of a secondary market for banks' claims and of the strengthening of commercial banks' balance sheets, private creditors showed increasing reluctance to engage in constructive negotiations with their sovereign debtors. In this context, the non-toleration of arrears began to be seen as a de facto veto power assigned to commercial banks over the Fund's lending decisions.
The policy of lending into arrears, therefore, was introduced in 1989 as an explicit move to reduce private creditors' leverage over the Fund's decision to provide financial support to crisis countries as well as the ensuing use of that leverage in their direct negotiations with sovereign debtors. The new policy basically legalised the Fund's lending to countries in arrears to commercial banks, subject to the existence of a discernible negotiation process ongoing between the sovereign and its private creditors. It also allowed for a further accumulation of arrears during the program period. This paved the way for a more active IMF involvement in the resolution of the debt crisis, and has remained ever since a pillar of the Fund's role in sovereign debt restructurings.
There have been various modifications of the LIA policy since its inception. In 1998, the policy was broadened to encompass bonded debt reflecting the changing composition of international capital flows and, more precisely, the securitization of sovereign debt. One year later, the policy was modified again to soften the requirements that negotiations be in place in order for a Fund supported program to be approved. Under the new policy, formal negotiations are not required to have begun as long as the member state is deemed to be making a good faith effort to reach a collaborative agreement with its creditors. This change was basically aimed at reflecting that, given the heterogeneity and number of bondholders potentially involved, initiating negotiations for the restructuring of bonded debt is likely to be much more difficult than for syndicated loans. A last modification was introduced in 2002 with the introduction of various principles aimed at providing some guidance for the interpretation of the good faith criterion.
Having reviewed its origins and subsequent modifications, the specific features that characterize the LIA policy remain to be identified. As we have seen, in essence the LIA policy constitutes a legal device to allow the Fund's lending in a set of circumstances in which financial programs were ruled out in the past. There are basically two procedural elements that differentiate a LIA program from a 'traditional' program:
o The inclusion of the good faith criterion as an additional condition for the Fund's disbursements. As mentioned above, this criterion was introduced without a clear definition. This called for a subsequent issuance of some principles to assess whether a member is undertaking efforts to reach a collaborative agreement with its private creditors: (i) the member should engage in an early dialogue with creditors, (ii) the member should share relevant information on a timely basis 1 , (iii) the member should provide creditors with an early opportunity to give input on the design of restructuring strategies and the design of individual instruments.
Notwithstanding this clarification, the good faith criterion is still perceived as ambiguous and its assessment remains fundamentally judgemental.
o While arrears remain outstanding, financing assurances reviews shall be conducted prior to the disbursement made available after the approval of the arrangement. Such reviews are aimed at determining whether adequate safeguards are in place for the further use of the Fund's resources, and to assess whether the member's adjustment efforts are undermined by developments in debtor-creditors relations.
Beyond these procedural requirements, the LIA policy does not really specify what the role of the IMF should be during a sovereign debt restructuring. It has often been argued that the provision of official financial support may mitigate the economic dislocation caused by the restructuring, thereby contributing to preserve the economic value of creditors' claims and facilitating the normalization of the member's external financial position. In this sense, some have established a parallelism between LIA programs and debtor-in-possession financing in private bankruptcies. There are, however, a number of channels through which the IMF can potentially influence the outcome of a restructuring that go well beyond the mere provision of financial support. First of all, just as any IMF-supported program, LIA programs are constructed upon a macroeconomic framework which includes conditionality over domestic adjustment. If domestic adjustment is interpreted as the counterpart of the "haircut"
imposed on creditors as a result of the debt restructuring, the program's macroeconomic framework unavoidably influences the negotiation process. In addition, the IMF can play an important role as a provider of information. This can be particularly important during a restructuring given the heightened uncertainty that tends to surround such episodes. Finally, the IMF can play an active role in a restructuring, for instance if it influences the sovereign's decision to restructure in the first place, if it takes part in meetings with private creditors or if it issues comfort letters to support participation in the exchange.
Not specifying ex ante these dimensions of the Fund's involvement in debt restructurings has provided the Institution with flexibility to adapt to the specific circumstances of each case. The
Argentine case, however, tends to put this scheme into question. This paper's departing hypothesis is that the ongoing strategic review may constitute a window of opportunity to go beyond the current procedural approach of the LIA policy, providing it with a clearer economic content to effectively guide the IMF in the various dimensions of its potential role during debt restructurings.
1. This includes an explanation of the economic problems and financial circumstances justifying the debt restructuring, a briefing on the broad outlines of a viable economic program to address the underlying problems and its implications on the broad financial parameters shaping the envelope of resources available for restructured claims, and the provision of a comprehensive picture of the proposed treatment of all claims, including those of official bilateral creditors, and the elaboration of the basis on which the debt restructuring would restore medium-term sustainability, bearing in mind that not all categories of claims may need to be restructured.
Case studies
We cover 8 sovereign debt restructurings: Argentina, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Pakistan, Russia, Serbia, Ukraine and Uruguay. Boxes 1 and 2 briefly put these debt restructurings in context. The IMF was involved in all of these cases through a financial program approved either prior, during and/or after the restructuring. As mentioned above, some of these countries broadly remained current in the service of their external private debt, implying that the LIA policy did not always come into effect. In addition, we have excluded from our analysis cases in which the LIA policy was (or ought to have been) applied as a result of minor external arrears which did not give rise to a broad-based restructuring of sovereign debt. In our view, although relevant for the design of the LIA policy, these cases raise issues clearly differentiated from the sovereign debt restructurings scenarios analyzed here, which we have left for further consideration. Our analysis revolves around four key factors which we consider relevant for a re-framing of the LIA policy. Firstly, we carry out a comparison between preemptive restructurings and post-default restructurings. In the second place, we try to distinguish cases in which the restructuring was comprehensive from those in which the authorities adopted a selective approach. Thirdly, we address the issue of domestic creditors and of whether these were treated differently from external creditors at the various stages of the crises. Finally, we focus on the role played by the IMF in the 8 restructurings analyzed.
Pre-emptive vs. post-default restructurings
A basic differentiation between the restructurings analyzed here is whether these were pre-emptive in nature, or were instead carried out following a sovereign default.
In principle, pre-emptive restructurings could be assumed to have been aimed at addressing liquidity problems, while post-default restructurings tend to be associated with situations of insolvency, which is why the debt to GDP ratio at the time of the restructurings tends to be higher in the post-default cases. According to this line of reasoning, the LIA policy should be expected to have been applied in the post-default restructurings. However, reflecting the complicated dynamics of debt restructurings, this association is not always straightforward.
Both types of restructurings were, in general, preceded by large rises in the level of external debt. Indeed, as shown in table 1, regarding the liquidity-solvency dichotomy, the situation of some of the preventive and post-default restructurings was ambiguous. In the preventive cases, this would be so for Pakistan and Uruguay, where the debt to GDP ratios stood at 84% and 103% respectively at the time the restructurings were launched. In the post-default cases, the debt to GDP ratios of Russia and Serbia stood at significantly lower levels: 52% and 64% respectively 2 . The liquidity indicators confirm this ambiguity, given that both Pakistan and Uruguay displayed a higher debt service to exports ratio than Russia, while the total debt service to reserves ratio was higher in the Dominican Republic, Pakistan and
Uruguay than in all of our post-default cases. In addition, as a result of minor arrears with specific suppliers or commercial banks, the LIA policy was applied to some pre-emptive cases, such as the Dominican Republic. Given that neither the sustainability of the debt stock nor the intensity of liquidity pressures suffice to explain the authorities' choice to remain current on debt payments during the restructurings, other factors must be at play. To a large extent, the decision to default was circumstantial and highly influenced by country specific political or social factors or by the authorities' capacity to deal with the economic dislocation caused by a crisis. This was clearly the case in Serbia where most of the arrears were 2. We have considered Serbia a case of insolvency given the volume of arrears accumulated during the 90´s, and the state of economic dislocation after the war.
accumulated during the conflict years, or in Argentina, where the default was announced following the fall of the elected government, partly in order to signal a change in the course of economic policies and to calm social unrest. In Ecuador, the default was a by-product of institutional weaknesses and especially fiscal rigidities, which constrained the authorities' ability to stabilize the economy and to formulate an effective crisis resolution package. In Russia, the default was part of broader emergency measures passed after the Parliament Another factor that may influence the authorities' choice is that remaining current on debt payments tends to facilitate the restructuring. Table 1 shows that pre-emptive restructuring were quicker to complete: 4 quarters on average against 7 quarters in the post-default cases. In addition, it would seem that the countries that restructured pre-emptively managed, on average, to secure a higher creditor participation in the debt exchange than in the post-default scenario: 97% against 88%. after which most Serbian arrears were cleared. These successive restructurings brought the Serbian debt to GDP ratio down to about 60%.
However, it is worth noting that these results are clearly biased by the Argentine case which, as mentioned above, was especially protracted and contentious. The clearest incentive to restructure pre-emptively, instead, may lie in the objective of recovering access to international financial markets. Indeed, all of the indicators used in table 1 suggest that the countries that remained current on external debt payments managed to tap international financial markets more quickly than defaulters. This is especially clear for the Dominican Republic and Uruguay, and less so for Ukraine and Pakistan which, in any case, had limited access to international financial markets also prior to the restructuring. Among the post-default cases, Russia was the country which recovered access to international financial markets quicker. This may be so because the Russian government defaulted on securities issued domestically while remaining current on post-soviet debt issued abroad.
On the other hand, table 1 shows that "haircuts" measured in NPV terms were much larger in post-default restructurings than in the pre-emptive cases: on average 41.8% against 19.2%. Furthermore, the share of debt affected by the restructuring both to GDP and to total debt was also higher in the post-default cases, implying that the extent of debt relief was significantly larger for defaulters. This may be so because the act of defaulting tends to alter the bargaining power of private creditors and the sovereign debtor in favour of the latter.
Indeed, in pre-emptive cases the liquidity relief is felt only after the debt exchange has been completed but not during the negotiation phase. Instead, in post default cases the completion of the debt exchange has the opposite effect given that it usually coincides with the resumption of debt servicing. Indeed, as illustrated especially by the Argentine case, every month of delay in the settlement of a default can generate substantial savings in foregone interest payments. As a result, defaulters may have a financial incentive to delay the agreement and search for harsher restructuring terms, while non-defaulters' best interest lies in reaching a quick agreement, which tends to come at the expense of a larger debt relief.
The shift in bargaining power from the debtors to the creditor entailed by the act of defaulting is illustrated in Chart 1. The various restructurings analyzed in this paper are ordered according to the authorities' degree of coerciveness for which we use the index developed by Enderlein et al. (2007) . As we can see, the most coercive debt restructurings analyzed here do clearly correspond to the post-default ones. In that respect, a comparison between the debt restructurings of Argentina and Uruguay is particularly illustrative: while the former took all its time to launch the debt exchange and impose large losses on bondholders, the latter emphasized the market-friendly nature of its restructuring, securing a fast settlement with moderate losses for investors.
It would seem, therefore, that the decision to default or to remain current on debt obligations has a strategic component and may be associated with the existence of a tradeoff between greater debt relief or a quicker access to international financial markets.
Ultimately, it is difficult to determine which category of restructurings had a better outcome. If the restoration of debt sustainability is taken as the main parameter to assess the outcomes of the restructurings, our case studies yield ambiguous results. Indeed, the two cases in which debt sustainability was more questioned following the restructuring were Argentina and Uruguay, which constitute to some extent the epitomes of our post-default and pre-emptive cases. The comparison of the evolution of post-restructuring GDP growth in pre-emptive and post-default cases also yields inconclusive results. Chart 1: Degree of coerciveness of pre-emptive vs. post-default restructurings
Partial vs. comprehensive debt restructurings
Another important distinction is whether the sovereign adopted a partial or a comprehensive debt restructuring strategy. Under the first approach, the sovereign focalized the restructuring in more or less specific debt instruments. Presumably, this tended to be the case when liquidity pressures were mostly generated by these specific debt instruments, or when the sovereign tried to ring-fence certain categories of debt in order to limit the disruption caused by the restructuring. The sovereign opted for a more comprehensive approach if the main categories of debt were involved in the restructuring (with the exception of multilateral obligations given the preferred creditor status of the IMF and other international financial institutions). Presumably, this tended to occur when liquidity pressures were so widespread that the restoration of debt sustainability required the involvement of most creditors in the restructuring, or when the sovereign tried to preserve some level of 'fairness', inter-creditor equity and thereby a market friendly approach.
Most of the case studies covered here have featured some degree of selectiveness at some point of the debt restructuring process. During the early stages of the debt crisis, this selective approach was particularly discernible in Argentina and Russia. In both cases, the authorities tried to alleviate short-term liquidity pressures through voluntary debt exchanges: the so-called June 2001 mega-swap in Argentina, and the July 1998 exchange of ruble denominated debt for Eurobonds in Russia. Eventually, both attempts not only failed to prevent the crisis and avoid a broader restructuring of debt or a default, but were counter-productive. Indeed, although the Argentine US$29.5 billion mega-swap involved a debt relief of about US$15 billion for the period 2001-2005, it increased debt repayments after 2006 by as much as US$65 billion, further pushing the Argentine economy into insolvency. In turn, the low participation in the Russian debt exchange (US$4.4 billion of a total eligible debt of US$41 billion) is considered to have acted as a wake up call, fuelling investors' concerns and further feeding upward pressures on spreads. Both the cases of Argentina and Russia, therefore, illustrate the risk posed by financial engineering operations designed to bridge short-term liquidity pressures in times of heightened vulnerability.
After these failed attempts to bridge liquidity pressures, the authorities of both countries were forced to broaden the scope of their restructuring. Russia, however, managed to stick to a selective approach and limited the default to domestically issued bonds while remaining current on most internationally issued debt, with the exception of external obligations inherited from the Soviet Union. In Argentina, the authorities tried to discriminate between various categories of creditors by phasing the restructuring: in phase I debt held by residents was exchanged for loans, and a phase II was contemplated to restructure debt held by non residents. Eventually, however, Argentina defaulted soon after completing phase I, and the restructuring was disorderly broadened to encompass most of its sovereign debt, Degree of coerciveness reducing the government's room for manoeuvre to discriminate between categories of creditors.
At the outset of their respective debt crises, Ecuador and Ukraine also tried to limit the scope of their restructurings to specific categories of debt. Originally, Ecuador suspended coupon payments only on its PDI and Discount Brady bonds and tried to persuade investors to limit the restructuring to that type of debt. Eventually, however, Ecuador also defaulted on its Eurobonds and was forced to carry out a comprehensive restructuring which involved some categories of domestic and bilateral official debt. In Ukraine, as mentioned above, the authorities carried out a wave of selective restructurings during 1998 and 1999 involving specific domestic and foreign bonds as well as loans. This, however, simply postponed the problem and Ukraine was forced to launch a comprehensive restructuring of its international bonds as early as February 2000.
A very specific scenario arises when the authorities' most immediate concern is to restructure bilateral official debt. In such circumstances, an agreement with the Paris Club tends to be sought in the first place. One of the conditions attached to Paris Club arrangements is the so-called comparability of treatment clause, which commits the sovereign to secure debt relief from private creditors on a similar scale as that granted previously by official creditors. As a result, the scope for a selective approach is reduced, and the authorities are forced to involve private creditors even when liquidity pressures are likely to have been sufficiently addressed with the Paris Club treatment. The Dominican Republic, Pakistan and Serbia can be said to be in this scenario. While in the Dominican Republic the amount of bonded debt eventually involved in the restructuring significantly exceeded the volume of the Paris Club treatment, in Pakistan private external debt was marginal, and its restructuring had a minor impact in terms of the restoration of debt sustainability (see Chart 2). In Serbia, the Paris Club treatment was part of a broader effort to normalize the country's external relations after the end of the war, which required a substantial debt relief in order to clear existing arrears. In this sense, the Paris Club agreement paved the way for negotiations with private creditors, and for the London Club agreement which was eventually reached in 2004.
Not all of the restructurings studied here have involved the Paris Club. In Uruguay, no treatment was agreed presumably because the authorities opted not to call in the Paris Club given that bilateral official debt was such a minor component of sovereign debt at the time of the restructuring. In Argentina, no comprehensive agreement with bilateral creditors could be reached. After the early cancellation of the IMF-supported program, this has been partly due to the fact that one of the key pre-conditions for a Paris Club treatment was no longer met. However, prior to that, other obstacles must have prevailed given that, although IMF programs were in place from January 2003 to August 2004, the opportunity to reach an agreement with the Paris Club which was not seized. Conversely, Ecuador and Ukraine signed a Paris Club treatment after having completed their respective private debt restructurings. Indeed, Ecuador signed an agreement with the Paris Club in September 2000, a few weeks after the official closure of the private debt exchange. In Ukraine, the Paris Club agreement was signed in July 2001, months after the completion of the private debt restructuring. In any case, our case studies shows that the comparability of treatment principle is not necessarily reciprocal: only if the Paris Club acts as the first mover in the restructuring is the sovereign committed to seek comparable treatment from private and official creditors. As a result, the timing of the Paris Club involvement may be strategic: sovereigns may have an incentive to postpone treatments in order to retain their ability to discriminate among investors and types of debt. Uruguay stands out in particular as being a case in which the authorities went at great length to preserve a market-friendly approach during the restructuring process. To some extent, this was aimed at differentiating the Uruguayan debt restructuring from the disorderly Argentine default. One of the manifestations of this market friendly approach was the absence of discriminatory practices between types of creditors. Indeed, from the outset Uruguay involved most of its non-multilateral sovereign debt and, as shown in Chart 2, creditors shared the burden of the restructuring quite proportionally to the ex ante structure of sovereign debt, which tends to signal a rather comprehensive approach. However, even in that case official bilateral debt and international loans were spared from the restructuring, presumably because both categories of debt were relatively minor components of total debt.
Chart 2 compares the ex ante structure of sovereign debt at the outset of the restructuring with the relative weight of the various types of debt ultimately involved in the restructuring, and the ex post structure of sovereign debt. In principle, those cases in which the relative weights of restructured debt are similar to the ex ante structure of sovereign debt should be associated with a comprehensive approach. Accordingly, the most comprehensive restructurings of our sample seem to have been the Serbian and Uruguayan cases. In spite of the selective approach described above, the Argentine debt restructuring, together with the Dominican one, can be labelled as intermediate cases in terms of their comprehensiveness. In turn, the restructurings in Ecuador, Pakistan, Russia and Ukraine seem to have been rather selective. In the case of Russia this was partly due to the weight of Soviet era debt in the restructuring, and to the fact that the default was limited to domestically issued debt. In
Ecuador, Pakistan and Ukraine, the selectiveness in the restructuring arises mainly because, to varying extents, domestic creditors were spared from the restructuring.
Domestic vs. external creditors
Partly as a result of an increase in the share of sovereign debt held by residents in emerging markets, some recent restructurings have featured an extensive involvement of domestic creditors in the crisis resolution strategy. This was the case especially for Argentina, Russia and Uruguay, and less so for Ecuador and Ukraine. In the cases of the Dominican Republic, Pakistan, Serbia and Ukraine, domestic debt was either a minor component of sovereign debt, or was mostly spared from the restructuring. In addition, it is worth noting that financial globalization makes it increasingly difficult to distinguish between domestic and external debt given that the opening up of the capital account enables residents to hold debt issued by their sovereign in foreign jurisdictions, and foreign investors to acquire claims issued domestically.
In this context, the jurisdiction of issuance seems to be losing relevance as an indicator of creditors' nationality.
In any case, domestic debt instruments and domestic creditors have certain specific features that deserve special attention. First of all, resident creditors are by definition subject to the domestic legal and regulatory framework, implying that the sovereign has more tools at its disposal to encourage or even coerce into their participation in a debt exchange. targeted at foreign creditors, given that by that time most Argentine residents had supposedly exchanged their bonds for guaranteed loans, which were excluded from the default. When the government pesified these loans, however, many residents swapped them back for the original bonds in default. Some did so voluntarily, exerting a right that was included in the November debt exchange, while others (mainly pension funds) were forced to swap back guaranteed loans for not accepting the terms of the pesoization.
Ultimately, the authorities granted a special treatment (lower haircut) to domestic pension funds in recognition of their coerced absorption of sovereign debt in late 2001.
Ecuador: the share of domestic to total sovereign debt at the time of the restructuring was close to 16%. As part of its default, Ecuador suspended servicing domestic obligations maturing between September 1999 and end-2000 involving debt with a face value of approximately US$346 million (close to 15% of total domestic debt). During the restructuring process, the government clearly differentiated between domestic and external creditors, offering residents much more lenient terms. Indeed, according to the IMF, the exchange of domestic debt for a new bond was effectively equivalent to a roll-over aimed primarily at alleviating liquidity pressures, and carrying practically no NPV loss.
Russia: as opposed to other cases analyzed here, rather than mobilizing domestic sources of finance to substitute for a loss of access to international financial markets, during the months leading to the August default, the Russian authorities were substituting ruble-denominated bonds for lower-yielding debt issued abroad. This was motivated by the short-term maturity profile of domestically issued bonds, which were absorbing the bulk of the upward pressures on yields. In addition, Russia enjoyed access to international financial markets up until a late stage of the crisis partly because it was perceived as being "too big" or "too nuclear"
to fall, thereby creating expectations for an international bailout should the need arise.
The restructuring of the Russian bonded debt had a clear domestic bias. Indeed, on August 1998 Russia defaulted solely on domestically issued bonds, 70% of which was estimated to be in the hands of residents. This is explained first and foremost by the aforementioned fact that the domestic bond market was generating most of the liquidity pressures undergone by the authorities. However, another motivation is likely to have been that of avoiding international litigation, and exploiting a "jurisdictional" advantage in the restructuring negotiations. Foreign creditors involved in the restructuring, however, were forced to deposit proceeds in restricted non-interest ruble accounts, and were faced with 5-years repatriation restrictions. This added substantial losses on the haircut already imposed by the restructuring, thereby moderating the aforementioned domestic bias. Ultimately, the bulk of holdout creditors (paid in full but subject to repatriation restrictions) were non-residents.
Ukraine: In the case of Ukraine most of the restructured debt was held by external creditors.
However, some of the domestic T-bills restructured in 1998 were in the hands of both domestic banks and international investors. The terms of the restructuring were milder for domestic investors (around 7%) than for foreign ones (40%). During the second restructuring, in order to respect inter-creditor equity, Ukraine was in technical default for a brief period.
These features of domestic debt pose significant trade-offs for the authorities and may have a bearing on the restructuring strategy ultimately chosen. Indeed, the aforementioned factors create incentives for the sovereign to discriminate between resident and non-resident creditors. On the one hand, if the sovereign is experiencing important liquidity pressures, it may opt to exhaust all potential domestic sources of finance in an attempt to remain current on its external obligations or to substitute for the loss of access to international financial markets. In the most extreme cases, this may entail a more or less forced restructuring of domestic sovereign debt. Under this scenario, the cost of that restructuring for the domestic economy is presumably deemed lesser than that of losing access to international financial markets and facing disruptive litigation from external creditors. On the other hand, the sovereign may focus on limiting the direct impact of the restructuring on the domestic economy and/or keeping the financial system afloat. Under this scenario, the authorities may opt to discriminate against external creditors, for instance by offering softer restructuring terms to domestic creditors or by excluding certain categories of domestic creditors from the restructuring.
We find instances of both types of discrimination in the case studies covered here.
The most relevant experiences are highlighted in Box 3. In Ecuador and Ukraine, the terms of the restructuring were worse for non-residents, presumably in order to mitigate the impact of the restructuring on the domestic economy. In the cases of Argentina and Russia, however, the direction of this discrimination is ambiguous. In Argentina, during the pre-default phase of the crisis, the authorities went at great length to involve domestic creditors and eventually carried out a semi-coercive restructuring of debt held by residents which has often been equated to a domestic default. In this way, the sovereign gambled for resurrection in an attempt to save the convertibility regime and to avoid external default. Once that strategy failed, the authorities focused the restructuring on external debt, although a substantial number of residents were ultimately also involved in the default. In Russia, the government defaulted on domestically issued debt while remaining current on post-Soviet debt issued abroad. This was primarily due to the fact that liquidity pressures stemmed mainly from the domestic market, although the objectives of avoiding international litigation and mitigating the loss of access to international financial markets are also likely to have played a role. The non-residents that were caught in the restructuring of GKOs and OFZs, however, suffered worse terms, given that on top of the restructuring, they faced capital controls restricting the repatriation of cash proceeds. . However, program-related documents do rarely specify whether the LIA policy was activated in these cases neither at the time of the approval of the program, nor at subsequent reviews.
Furthermore, the fulfilment of the procedural requirements of the LIA policy (financing assurances reviews and good faith criterion) does not seem to have been always
systematically assessed, at least in the cases of Ecuador, Russia and Ukraine. Even when program-related documents refer to these procedural requirements, the assessment of their fulfilment is brief and unarticulated. As a result, these programs do not differ substantially from 'traditional' ones, which tends to blur the specificities of the LIA policy.
Regarding the starting point of the Fund's program involvement in debt restructurings, two broad groups of countries can be identified: This distinction between 'inherited' and 'new' programs is not trivial. Indeed, the presence of inherited programs implies that, prior to the eruption of the debt problem the IMF was already financially exposed to the countries which undertook the restructuring. Unless total fund's exposure increases, augmentations of existing programs or programs approved during the restructuring in order to succeed the inherited ones, do not provide fresh resources and, at least partially, do simply roll-over existing obligations to the Fund. This tends to undermine the debtor-in-possession argument as a justification for the policy of Lending Into Arrears.
Furthermore, it may create a conflict of interest for the IMF, which may come to be perceived as primarily concerned with safeguarding its resources and preserving its preferred creditor status. In turn, this tends to undermine the Fund's legitimacy as an independent actor charged with providing a public good aimed at improving the outcome of the restructuring and limiting its impact on international prosperity. This conflict of interests tends to be accentuated in the case of large inherited programs where the Fund may fear the consequences of an extension of the default to multilateral obligations. This was the case of Argentina, which contributes to explain why the involvement of the Fund in that restructuring turned out to be so contentious.
In any case, there are a number of dimensions of the Fund's involvement in sovereign debt restructurings that go beyond the mere provision of financial assistance. A first relevant question is whether the IMF exerted any discernible influence on the sovereigns' decision to default or restructure. This is not easy to tell given that, for obvious reasons, the discussions between the Fund and its members on such sensitive issues are not made public. In addition, it is the IMF's firm policy not to interfere with members' contractual obligations. However, in some cases many observers believe the Fund to have played a significant role in the decision making process that resulted in the launching of the restructuring. This would be the case of Ecuador, Ukraine and Uruguay, in the first case to address a clearly unsustainable situation
6
, and in the latter cases to fill residual financing needs under the Fund supported programs. In Argentina and Russia, the Fund did also play a role in the decision to default, albeit an indirect one. Indeed, in both cases after having lost access to international financial markets, the suspension of the Fund's financial support dried up the last available significant source of foreign exchange to continue honouring sovereign debt. A third scenario arises when the Paris Club opens the restructuring process, as was the case for the Dominican Republic, Pakistan and Serbia. Under this scenario, the IMF is involved in the first place as a pre-requisite for obtaining the Paris Club treatment, and private 6. Stanley Fisher acknowledged in May 2000 having discussed with Ecuador the pros and cons of a default of, "pointing out the risks of disruptive legal challenges in case of a default and the difficulties of sustaining a viable cash position in case of staying current on debt obligations".
creditors are involved later in fulfilment of the comparability of treatment clause. Although it is difficult to argue that the Fund influenced the decision to renegotiate debt, it is clear that it played a pivotal role in this well established restructuring framework.
A second crucial dimension of the Fund's involvement in debt workouts is the setting of the resource envelope of the restructuring. This relates to the macroeconomic framework and conditionality embedded in Fund supported programs approved to support a restructuring. The Fund's role as an adjustment agent is undisputed in 'traditional' IMF programs. During a restructuring, however, the level of domestic adjustment associated with the Fund's conditionality is unavoidably linked to the relief or haircut that is necessary from private creditors in order to restore debt sustainability. As a result, it is likely that the establishment by the Fund of an adjustment path influences the negotiation between the sovereign debtor and its private creditors.
In most of the case studies analyzed here, the IMF has continued to play the role of an adjustment agent through the programs approved in the context of a restructuring. This was particularly clear when the Paris Club was involved early on, again as part of the well institutionalized restructuring framework described above. Although the Paris Club was only involved at a later stage of the restructuring, or not involved at all, this also tended to be the case for Ecuador, Ukraine and Uruguay. Conversely, the Fund played at best a minor role in setting the resource envelope of the Argentine and Russian restructurings. In the latter case, the IMF programs were off-track when the novation scheme was carried out and when an This is probably due to the fact that member states have the right to preclude the Fund from disclosing certain market sensitive pieces of information. As a result, the informational role of the Fund tends to be more intense in 'market-friendly' restructurings. For instance, the Fund published most program-related documents in the cases of the Dominican Republic or Uruguay. Instead, few documents were published in the cases of Argentina and Ecuador.
Although references to debt sustainability are relatively frequent in program-related documents, no fully-fledged debt sustainability analysis was provided by the IMF in most of the cases under consideration.
A fourth dimension of the Fund's involvement in sovereign debt restructurings is the provision of incentives to the parts involved in the process. The Fund has various instruments to provide such incentives. A central one is the good faith clause. Indeed, by conditioning the Fund's financial support to the authorities' good faith, that clause is aimed at creating incentives to adopt a collaborative stance in the debt workout. However, in spite of the 2002 attempt to clarify its content, assessing compliance with the good faith criterion is fundamentally judgemental and sometimes arbitrary. This is especially illustrated by the Argentine case, where the Fund's program was not suspended on the basis of a breach of the good faith clause even if most observers believe that, rather than engaging in a constructive dialogue, the authorities simply presented a series of take or leave it offers clearly detrimental to creditors' interests. As a result, at least in its current form, the good faith clause has lost much of its credibility as an enforceable obligation attached to the Fund's lending into arrears.
Additionally, the Fund has often tried to coordinate creditors by encouraging participation in the debt exchange. This usually takes the form of a comfort letter issued by the IMF's managing director to the members of the financial community in support of the authorities' economic program and the terms of the restructuring. In some cases, the Fund has gone beyond the mere provision of its seal of approval. This was especially the case for Uruguay, where the Managing Director made it clear that an insufficient participation in the debt exchange could lead to a suspension of the Fund's financial support and, thereby, to a much higher likelihood of a sovereign default. Indeed, the Comfort letter issued on April 22,
specified that "(…) achieving these objectives is a condition for completion of the next (third) review under Uruguay's stand-by arrangement. A successful debt exchange requires high participation to allow the program to go forward and the forthcoming review to be completed". Conclusions and Policy Implications
One of the main conclusions that can be extracted from our case studies is the lack of consistency that has tended to characterize the involvement of the IMF in recent sovereign debt restructurings. Indeed, we have discerned several country specific factors shaping the Fund's approach to most of the dimensions of the restructuring processes analyzed above
A first question to be raised is whether the IMF should preserve this case by case approach, or whether it should adopt a more systematic framework to shape its involvement in countries that are renegotiating sovereign debt. The current case by case approach has had the advantage of providing the Fund with some degree of flexibility to adapt to a changing world and to customize its crisis resolution strategies to potentially very different types of debt crises. However, this lack of consistency tends to exacerbate the uncertainty and informational asymmetries that are often associated with sovereign debt restructurings, and provides fertile ground for criticism by creating the perception that creditors or debtors are treated unequally depending on the specific circumstances that surround each crisis. The international community, therefore, needs to decide whether the IMF should play a more standardized role in sovereign debt restructurings and, if so, in what dimensions and through which instruments.
An important obstacle to frame the Fund's role in debt restructurings is the lack of a policy or instrument designed specifically for that purpose. This paper has focused on the policy of lending into arrears given that, more often than not, the Fund's programs in place . Indeed, rather than a policy in the broad sense of the term, it simply constitutes a device to legalize the Fund's lending in a very specific scenario, introducing loose procedural requirements which are absent in 'traditional' programs. A second question, therefore, is whether the current procedural approach ought to be maintained or whether, instead, the LIA policy should be endowed with a meaningful economic rationale. By that we mean specifying the role to be played by the IMF in a number of specific dimensions in such a way as to contribute to improve the outcome of sovereign debt restructurings.
As argued above, a first dimension is the role of the IMF in the decision making In addition, the definition of a macroeconomic adjustment path under an IMF-supported program is not necessarily detrimental of debtor/creditor negotiations. This is so because IMF programs define a resource envelope only in the short-term (one to three years).
The debt relief resulting from the negotiations between creditors and debtors, instead, depends on a much longer adjustment path. Consequently, even if the IMF agrees with its members on an adjustment path over the time horizon of a program, there is still room for the negotiations with creditors to yield very different results in terms of debt relief.
The third potential dimension is the informational role of the IMF. As argued above, the amount of information disclosed by the Fund during sovereign debt restructurings has varied substantially from case to case. What is perhaps more surprising is that the format and scope of debt sustainability analyses included in published IMF documents has also exhibited substantial variations. In fact, the IMF has generally restrained from systematically disclosing full-fledged debt sustainability analyses (DSAs) of countries engaged in a debt restructuring. Flows and Fair Debt Restructurings could be used for that purpose. An obstacle, however, is that although the Fund broadly supported the initiative, it has shown reluctance to incorporate the principles in its own internal operative. This is partly due to a far from monolithic support on the part of emerging issuers, and to the perception that the principles may be somewhat biased in favour of private creditors' interests. Moreover, there are some differences between current Fund's policies and some aspects of the Principles such as the use of the creditor committees (see Progress Report on Crisis Resolution, SM/05/107). In any case, the principles could be used as a basis for developing more substantive guidance for the assessment of the good faith criterion. In particular, the IMF could focus on securing some level of inter-creditor equity, trying to avoid unjustified discriminatory practices. This could be shaped along the lines of the Paris Club comparability of treatment clause, which has contributed to restrain discrimination and secure some level of equitable burden-sharing in past restructurings. As argued later, this framework would need to recognize the specificities of domestic creditors.
Our case study analysis has revealed that the presence of 'inherited' programs can impair the Fund's potential to play a substantive role in restructuring processes. Indeed, the Indeed, the prospect of acceding additional IMF resources rather than simply rolling over existing obligations could realign countries' incentives, making compliance with the programs' conditionality (including the good faith criterion) likelier. In addition, this framework would reduce countries' scope to threaten with defaulting on their multilateral obligations in order to press for the approval of successive program reviews during a sovereign debt restructuring.
We consider that the introduction of a standstill on purchases and repurchases of 'inherited' programs following a sovereign default would not substantially alter the seniority status of IMF loans because such obligations would never be made subject to a re-negotiation process (as opposed to other official obligations such as Paris Club bilateral loans). The IMF may want to underline this point by introducing some sort of penalty charge proportional to the suspended repurchases (and maybe also to the duration of the program suspension) payable after the resumption of private debt servicing. In fact, by reinforcing the aforementioned debtor in possession rationale for LIA programs, such a scheme could even reinforce the legitimacy of the Fund's preferred creditor status. It would also address one of the criticisms of the policy of lending into arrears in its current form: that rather than being targeted at mitigating the economic dislocation caused by the crisis, financial assistance following a sovereign default is mainly targeted at avoiding missed payments on IMF loans and, thereby, at defending the Fund's own financial position.
We are aware that this reform, by committing the institution to provide fresh funding and given its interest in safeguarding its own resources, could have important ex-ante effects.
It could reduce IMF's incentives to lend before financial problems appear, as to guarantee space for providing capital when problems arise. Observed have argued, however, that the IMF tends to over lend previous to financial stress episodes at the cost of being forced to restrain from further lending when debt problems blow up. If this is actually the case, then the design we propose could, indeed, partly correct this situation.
Another problem associated with the current framework is that the LIA policy basically ignores arrears to private domestic creditors. A first related problem is that, as . Furthermore, our analysis has identified a number of potential dimensions of the Fund's involvement in debt restructurings which could have applied both to our pre-emptive and to post-default cases. Indeed, the Fund's advice on the best course of action to restore debt sustainability as well as its role as an adjustment agent and provider of information and incentives were equally relevant in both scenarios. In this context, it is arguable whether the presence of external arrears to private creditors has more of an economic justification as a trigger of a specific IMF policy than a pre-emptive broadbased revision of the sovereign's debt terms. 
